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Quality of Independent Expert Reports Used in Australian Takeovers 
Abstract 
In this article, the authors investigate whether there has been an improvement in the quality of 
independent expert reports following ASIC's revisions to RG111 and RG112. These revisions include 
additional disclosures on the valuation methodologies used and explanation if the valuation was 
materially different from the company's recent trading price. It was expected that these revisions have led 
to an improvement in report quality where quality is determined by the accuracy of the expert's valuation. 
Results show that after the 2011 revisions, valuations became more accurate based on updated 
measures of report quality. However, experts with higher fees did not provide higher quality reports on 
average. The findings indicate that the independence provisions within the new rules were effective. 
Furthermore, they warn commissioning firms that higher fees are not necessarily indicative of higher 
quality reports. 
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INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
Australian companies receiving a takeover offer can commission an independent expert,4 either 
voluntarily or as a requirement of s 640 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth),5 to assess if the 
bidder's6 offer is fair and reasonable. An independent expert report (IER) provides the public 
with an unbiased and credible assessment of the merits of a proposed change of control 
transaction (Deloitte 2013), thus acting to reduce information asymmetry and protect 
shareholders from accepting opportunistic takeover offers (Trautwein and Quartullo 2012). 
The expert's opinion whether the transaction is fair and reasonable,7 along with the expert's 
extensive analysis underlying this opinion, assists target8 shareholders make an informed 
decision whether to accept or reject the proposal. 
IER quality and expert independence has attracted considerable regulatory attention in the past 
two decades.  In 2005 the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC)9 released 
Consultation Paper 62: Better experts' reports (CP 62), which sought to improve IER quality. 
The recommendations of CP 62 led ASIC to amend and consolidate their existing independent 
expert policy statements and practice notes into two documents in 2007: Regulatory Guide 
111: Content of expert reports (RG 111) and Regulatory Guide 112: Independence of experts 
(RG 112). In 2010 ASIC released Consultation Paper 143: Expert reports and independence 
of experts: Updates to RG 111 and RG 112 (CP 143), which yet again reviewed issues relating 
to expert independence and IER quality. Consequently, RG 111 and RG 112 were most 
recently revised on 30 March 2011 (hereafter the '2011 Revisions') to address the concerns over 
quality and independence. These revisions were motivated by the need for an improvement in 
the transparency and reliability of company valuations for the benefit of the shareholder. 
One of several noteworthy changes stemming from the 2011 Revisions includes the 
requirement for experts to discuss the weight placed on each valuation methodology used in 
the report by identifying one valuation methodology as primary and others as cross-checks to 
the primary valuation used (RG 111.68).10 Additionally, when the expert's valuation is 
materially different from the company's price in recent trading (plus a reasonable control 
premium), the expert's report must comment on the reasons for this disparity. These additional 
disclosures, along with more stringent independence requirements on the commissioning firm, 
were designed to improve the quality of expert reports (BDO 2011). However, the effectiveness 
of the 2011 Revisions in improving IER quality has yet to be empirically substantiated. 
This study uses an empirical approach to test whether IER quality improved subsequent to the 
2011 Revisions. Two separate proxies for report quality are utilised: (1), the accuracy of the 
expert's valuation relative to the executed price paid by the successful bidder and (2) the scaled 
range of the expert's valuation.11 Bugeja, Da Silva Rosa and Walter (2005) used the former as 
a proxy for IER quality, and suggested future researchers use the latter. The scaled range used 
                                                                
4 Throughout this paper ‘expert’ and ‘independent expert’ are used interchangeably. 
5 Unless stated otherwise, sections referred to in this paper relate to the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). 
6 ‘Bidder’ refers to the person or group who make an offer for a target company (s9). 
7 An expert is required to express an opinion whether a takeover bid is ‘fair and reasonable’ (s 640). ‘Fair and 
reasonable is defined in RG 111.10-111.17. 
8 ‘Target’ refers to the company whose securities are to be acquired under the bid (s 9). 
9 Note that ASIC superseded the Australian Securities Commission (ASC) in 1998, which superseded the National 
Companies and Securities Commission (NCSC) in 1991. 
10 ASIC uses the phrase ‘valuation methodology’ to describe company valuation methods, such as discounted cash 
flow and earnings multiples. When used in this context, the term ‘methodology’ does not carry its academic 
implications relating to the ontological and epistemological underpinnings of research. 
11 Throughout this study the ‘price paid by the successful bidder’ and the ‘executed price’ are used 
interchangeably.  
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in this study is defined as the difference of the experts high and low valuation expressed as a 
percentage of the mid-point of the valuation and has strong justification from the requirements 
to use ranges by RG 111. The expert's valuation relative to the executed price reflects the 
takeover market's assessment of IER quality and is theoretically grounded in the competitive 
acquisition market hypothesis. Utilising both proxies overcomes the key limitations of using 
each proxy in isolation and allows for more informative conclusions.12 
Furthermore, ASIC requires the commissioning party to consider more than just fees when 
selecting an expert13. Consequently, the new provisions provide commissioning firms with 
guidance when selecting from a field of potential experts with different quoted fees. This study 
also tests whether experts with lower fees produce inferior quality reports containing valuations 
which are further from the executed price, and have a wider valuation range. 
To conduct this study, data from target statements and annual reports were manually collected 
for all successful cash takeovers of companies listed on the Australian Securities Exchange 
("ASX") between 2008 and 2013 (inclusive).14 Utilising this data, the hypotheses were tested 
using empirical techniques. The study is presented as follows: the Institutional Framework 
section introduces the regulatory background and requirements for valuations which is 
followed by the Literature Review. The section titled Hypotheses Development describes the 
two hypotheses related to the research question, whilst the section titled Sample and Method 
covers the method used in the study and the sample selection process and data sources. The 
Model Development section describes and examines the data using descriptive statistics and 
develops the multiple regression model. The results are presented, interpreted and analysed in 
the Results and Discussion section, and finally the Conclusion summarises the results.  
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
Regulation 
ASIC provides regulatory guidance with regard to the contents of IERs and independence of 
experts through RG 111 and RG 112.15 Chapter 6 of the Corporations Act deals with takeovers. 
A company which has received a takeover offer is required to prepare a Target's Statement 
(s 633), which must include all information that shareholders would reasonably require to make 
an informed decision whether to accept the offer (s 638 (1)). When commissioned, IERs are 
included in the Target's Statement lodged with the ASX. 
 
IERs may be legally required or voluntarily commissioned. Section 640 requires target firms 
to commission an IER in circumstances where the bidder has a superior bargaining position, or 
where a conflict of interest may exist between the boards of the target and bidder.16 
                                                                
12 The key limitations are that the scaled range does not take into account how close the expert’s valuation is to 
the firm’s intrinsic price. Whereas, the accuracy of the expert’s valuation relative to the executed price does not 
explicitly measure the width of the expert’s valuation range. 
13 The commissioning party (or commissioning firm) refers to the group who hires the expert to provide an IER. 
14 Only takeovers using 100% cash consideration were included in the sample. 
15 Regulatory Guides provide guidance to regulated entities by: 
 Explaining when and how ASIC will exercise specific powers under legislation (primarily the 
Corporations Act) 
 Explaining how ASIC interprets the law 
 Describing the principles underlying ASIC’s approach 
 Giving practical guidance 
16 Specifically, s 640 requires an IER to be prepared in the following circumstances 
- The bidder’s voting power in the target is 30% or more; or 
- For a bidder who is, or includes, an individual – the bidder is a director of the target; or 
- For a bidder who is, or includes, a body corporate – a director of the bidder is a director of the target 
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Alternatively, where no legal obligation exists, a firm may voluntarily commission an IER to 
ensure shareholders are as informed as possible and to exercise prudent corporate governance 
(William Buck 2014). An IER must include the expert's opinion whether the takeover is fair 
and reasonable and provide reasons why that opinion was reached (s 640).17 "An offer is fair if 
the value of the offer price or consideration is equal to or greater than the value of the securities, 
which are the subject of the offer" (RG 111.11).18 The expert's assessment of fairness is 
complicated considerably when the bidder provides its own securities as consideration (Eddey 
1993). In such circumstances, the expert is also required to value the bidder's shares in order to 
determine whether the offer is fair (RG 111.30). Synergies specific to a particular bidder (that 
is, not available to other bidders) should not be considered in determining if an offer is fair 
(RG 111.11).19 Instead, synergies available to a specific bidder is considered in the expert's 
assessment of reasonableness. 
 
An offer is reasonable if it is fair. However, an offer can be reasonable despite being not fair if 
the expert believes there are reasons why target security holders should accept the offer 
(RG 111.12). One of many factors that an expert may consider in determining if an offer is 
reasonable is any special value of the target to the bidder, such as synergies (RG 111.13).20 
Synergies are discussed further in the literature review. 
 
Company Valuation Methodologies 
Experts must exercise skill and professional judgement in selecting the most appropriate 
valuation methodology. To assist users to understand the report, the expert must describe, and 
reasonably justify the selection of the methodologies used in the report. Where possible, experts 
are encouraged to use more than one valuation methodology and comment on any differences 
between the methods (RG 111.65). Although experts provide a range of values rather than a 
single valuation point, the range must be as narrow as possible since "a broad range of values 
undermines the usefulness of the report" (RG 111.79). This provides strong justification for the 
use of the scaled range as a proxy of IER quality. 
 
ASIC does not prescribe which valuation methodologies experts should use (RG 111.47), but 
suggests that it is appropriate for experts to use discounted cashflow (DCF), earnings multiples, 
realisation of assets, a security's quoted price and alternative genuine offers received by the 
target (RG 111.69).  
 
Although many valuations use methodologies other than DCF in certain specific target 
circumstances, and more recent literature on corporate valuation has produced more 
                                                                
17 Fair and reasonable are two distinct criteria requiring individual consideration. Fair and reasonable is not a 
compound phrase (RG 111.10). 
18 This comparison should be made assuming an arm’s length transaction between informed parties who are 
willing, but not anxious (RG 111.11). 
19 Synergy from an acquisition is ‘defined as the value of the combined firm less the value of the two firms as 
separate entities’ (Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe 2010, p.908). 
20 According to RG 111.13, an expert may consider the following in deciding if an offer is reasonable: 
 the bidder’s pre-existing voting power in securities in the target; 
 other significant security holding blocks in the target; 
 the liquidity of the market in the target’s securities; 
 taxation losses, cash flow or other benefits through achieving 100% ownership of the target;  
 any special value of the target to the bidder, such as particular technology, the potential to write off 
outstanding loans from the target, etc;  
 the likely market price if the offer is unsuccessful; and  
 the value to an alternative bidder and likelihood of an alternative offer being made  
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sophisticated valuation methodologies, a recent study by Bancel and Mittoo (2014) found that 
practitioners still prefer to use DCF as a primary methodology. They found that 80% of 
practitioners used both DCF and Relative Valuation methodologies in corporate valuation. 
They further state that Free Cash to Equity Model (FCFE), a variant of the DCF model, is the 
most commonly used in valuation for mergers and acquisitions. Furthermore, this is consistent 
with Matolcsy (1995), who claims that DCF is superior to other valuation methodologies.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Independent Expert Reports and Valuation Methodologies 
Following the introduction of the requirement for IERs in Australian takeovers in 1981, 
Matolcsy (1982) was the first to publish a paper on IERs.21 Matolcsy (1982) argued that, 
regardless of the stock market's informational efficiency, IERs were unnecessary and 
unjustified. He contended that IERs do not add value in efficient markets as the most current 
share price is the best estimate of the company's value. Alternatively, if the market was 
inefficient due to irrational investors failing to act upon publicly available information, IERs 
are unlikely to add value as market participants may also ignore the expert's report. Finally, he 
suggested that if the market was inefficient due to investors and analysts only holding a subset 
of all available information relevant to estimating a company's value, an IER would not add 
value since no single expert would have access to all the requisite information to accurately 
estimate the company's value. The period in which his paper was published was characterised 
by strong support for free market ideals and reduced regulation (McDonald et al. 2003).   
Matolcsy (1982) also criticised the notion that experts have the capacity to determine whether 
a takeover offer is fair and reasonable, given each investor has unique financial objectives, risk 
tolerance and return expectations. As such, Matolcsy (1982, p.103) claimed that "the 
independent expert's advice may determine the economic worth (price) of a company, but not 
whether the takeover offer price is fair and reasonable." Rather, he contended that each 
shareholder individually judges what constitutes a fair and reasonable takeover offer with 
reference to their own specific circumstances. Given this, he argued that it is impossible for 
experts to make a statement on the fairness and reasonableness of a takeover offer, despite 
regulators requiring experts to do so. Consequently, Matolcsy (1982, p.104) called for 
regulatory bodies and/or supporters of IERs to "develop theoretical arguments and/or provide 
evidence, which demonstrate the net benefit of an independent expert's advice." In the absence 
of such evidence, Matolcsy (1982) suggested the requirement for IERs in Australian takeovers 
should be abandoned. 
Matolcsy's (1982) criticism of the experts' capacity to determine whether a takeover offer is 
fair and reasonable was relevant in the 1980s when his paper was published. However, his 
criticisms bear little relevance in recent times, as the introduction of the Financial Services 
Reform Act 2001 (FRSA) distinguished between general and specific financial advice.22 The 
Financial Services Guide (FSG) which is compulsorily provided with all expert reports 
specifically states that IERs only provide general financial product advice, not personal 
financial product advice, and that the IER does not take into account each investor's personal 
                                                                
21 Effective from 27 August 1981, s23 of the Commonwealth Companies (Acquisition of Shares) Act (now the 
Corporations Act 2001) gave the National Companies and Securities Commission (NCSC) (now ASIC) the 
authority to require an IER to be commissioned in certain circumstances. 
22 Regulatory Guide 146: Training of financial product advisors outlines the distinction between general and 
specific advice in detail. 
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objectives, financial situation or needs. Therefore, the introduction of the FRSA in 2001 
invalidates Matolcsy's (1982) argument, as IERs expressly provide general financial advice. 
In his second paper on IERs, Matolcsy (1995) claimed there was still a lack of empirical 
evidence to demonstrate IERs add value. He argued that IERs only add value if two conditions 
are met. Firstly, the expert uncovers 'private' information which is not available to the market. 
Secondly, the valuation methodology adopted by the expert reflects the synergistic benefits of 
the takeover. Although Matolcsy (1995) briefly argues that the latest share price is the best 
estimate of value, his paper primarily focuses on the adequacy of the valuation methodologies 
used by experts. 
Matolcsy (1995) classified company valuation methodologies into four broad groups: asset-
based, capitalised earnings, DCF and other techniques such as share price history, resource-in-
the-ground or a combination of these methods. He found the valuation methodologies 
concluded upon most frequently by experts were variations of asset-based methods (31.1%) 
and capitalised earnings (26.9%), while other techniques were used 33.6% of the time.23 
Despite Matolcsy's (1995) support for the use of DCF, he found it was the least utilised 
methodology, only being used in 8.4% of reports.24 
Although Matolcsy (1995) found that asset-based valuations and capitalised earnings were the 
methodologies most utilised, he argued that both methodologies were inherently flawed. He 
claimed that asset-based methods produce meaningless valuations given the book value of 
assets often bear little relevance to realisable values, replacement costs or current costs (even 
when adjusted in an attempt to overcome this problem), and that valuing identifiable intangible 
assets is fraught with inaccuracy.25 However, Matolcsy's (1995) most significant criticism of 
asset-based valuations was their failure to incorporate the synergistic benefits attainable by 
combining the individual companies. 
Similarly, he suggested that the capitalised earnings method suffers from several fundamental 
problems regarding inconsistent market efficiency assumptions. According to Matolcsy 
(1995), when an expert estimates maintainable earnings, there is an implicit assumption that 
estimates produced by all other experts and analysts are incorrect and that the market value of 
the particular company being valued is informationally inefficient. Yet he argues that at the 
same time there is an implicit assumption that the maintainable earnings for all comparable 
companies have been correctly estimated and the market for their shares is efficient. As such, 
Matolcsy (1995, p.5) argues that "the independent experts cannot have it both ways." If experts 
assume the market is efficient, current market price should be the best estimate of value. 
Conversely, if experts assume the market is inefficient, "then all inputs into the capitalised 
earnings model need to be re-estimated" (Matolcsy 1995, p.5). 
Independent Expert Reports and Takeover Premiums 
The empirical studies of how IERs affect takeover premiums show mixed results. Eddey (1993) 
suggests that premiums for takeovers with a legally required IER were not significantly 
different to premiums for takeovers which did not use an IER26. Bugeja (2005a) however found 
                                                                
23 Matolcsy’s (1995) study was based on a sample of 323 expert reports used in Australian takeovers between 
1988 and 1993. 
24 Furthermore, if one expert who consistently used the DCF methodology had been omitted from Matolcsy’s 
(1995) sample, DCF was used in less than 4% of valuations. 
25 Examples of identifiable intangible assets include mastheads, television licences and trademarks (Matolcsy 
1995). 
26 Eddey’s (1993) findings were based on a sample of Australian cash takeover bids between January 1988 and 
1991. During that period there were 364 takeover bids which offered cash-based consideration or a cash 
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that target shareholders receive significantly lower takeover premiums when IERs are legally 
required.27 
In support of the notion that IERs add value, Bugeja (2007) found that voluntarily 
commissioned IERs increase the likelihood of an upward price revision. Furthermore, Eddey 
(1993) found that directors almost always recommend bid acceptance when the expert provides 
a fair and reasonable opinion, which is consistent with findings by Bugeja (2006).28  
Expert Independence and Report Quality 
To protect against potential collusion between experts and directors, ASIC requires that 
directors of the commissioning firm should not adopt the expert's recommendations without 
critically analysing the report (RG 112.61). Common law supports this notion. In ASIC v 
Healey (2011) FCA 717, Judge Middleton of the Federal Court cautioned directors against 
relying on management and advisors (such as auditors, expert reports and external advisors) 
without critically evaluating the information put before them.  Therefore, the directors' 
recommendation and the expert's opinion should be independent of one another, but will often 
agree with one another. 
Bugeja (2005b) found the rate at which experts agreed with the recommendations of the target's 
Board was not influenced by the expert having other business dealings with the target, but the 
stock market viewed IERs prepared by the target's auditor as non-independent.29 Bugeja, Da 
Silva Rosa and Walter (2005) found that quality was higher, and that fees were not lower, for 
reports prepared by experts with other business dealings with the target. They also suggest that 
their findings support Australia's policy which allows companies to use their audit firm for 
valuation services, despite this being prohibited in fairness opinions in the United States. 
Bugeja, Da Silva Rosa and Walter (2005) used the scaled range of the expert's valuation as a 
proxy of report quality30 and found that reports prepared by experts with other business 
dealings with the target have significantly narrower average scaled valuation ranges than 
unrelated experts.31 Their regression model was re-run including an indicator variable for 
reports that used DCF as one of the expert's valuation methodologies, but the coefficient was 
insignificant which does not support Matolcsy's (1995) endorsement of the DCF methodology.  
According to RG 111.79, the scaled range used as the proxy for report quality should be as 
narrow as possible since a "broad range of values undermines the usefulness of the report." 
However, the isolated use of the scaled range as a proxy of report quality does not measure the 
proximity of the expert's valuation to the company's intrinsic value. The usefulness, and thus 
quality, of an expert report containing a valuation widely divergent from the executed price is 
questionable. Bugeja, Da Silva Rosa and Walter (2005) recommend future researchers use the 
                                                                
alternative, 170 of which had IERs issued as a requirement of the Corporations law. There were 14 cash bids 
where IERs were voluntarily commissioned, but these were excluded from Eddey’s (1993) sample of IERs. 
27 Bugeja’s (2005a) results were based on a sample of 191 statutory IERs prepared for Australian takeovers 
between 1990 and 2000. In this period there were 649 takeovers, approximately 45% of which had IERs prepared. 
Approximately 65% of the IERs were legally required, however voluntary IER use increased in the later years of 
the study. 
28 The results were based on all 191 legally required IERs prepared between 1990 and 2000. 
29 This suggests that although IERs prepared by experts with other business dealings with the target were 
independent in fact, they were not independent in appearance which reduced their utility (Bugeja 2005b). 
30 The scaled range they used was equal to the difference between the expert’s high valuation and low valuation 
expressed as a percentage of the target share price three months prior to the takeover announcement. A lower 
scaled range is indicative of a higher quality report. Their results were unchanged when they expressed the 
valuation range as a percentage of the expert’s low valuation, and high valuation. 
31 Bugeja, Da Silva Rosa and Walter’s (2005) findings are based on all 191 legally required IERs prepared for 
Australian takeover bids initiated between 1990 and 2000 
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accuracy of the expert's valuation relative to the final executed price as a proxy of report 
quality. However, this does not explicitly consider the range of the expert's valuation. To 
partially overcome the deficiencies of using each proxy in isolation, this study uses both the 
scaled range and the accuracy of the expert's valuation relative to the executed price as proxies 
of IER quality. 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Since the introduction of the revisions, experts have been required to discuss the weight placed 
on each valuation methodology used in the valuation report by identifying one methodology as 
primary and others as cross-checks to the valuation (RG 111.68). Importantly, if the expert 
provides a valuation which is materially different from the company's share price (plus a 
reasonable control premium), the 2011 iteration of RG 111 and RG 112 requires the expert to 
comment on the underlying reasons for the disparity (RG 111.65). These revisions ensure a 
greater degree of transparency regarding how the expert's final valuation was determined. 
Furthermore, the 2011 Revisions allowed experts to use DCF to value mineral assets at the pre-
reserve stage.32 ASIC did not previously allow experts to use DCF to value these assets even 
though doing so was standard practice in the valuation industry and the alternative was to use 
opaque 'yardstick' methodologies which potentially undervalued the assets, thus reducing the 
usefulness of the IER (BDO 2011). Therefore, this expanded use of the DCF methodology is 
another potential source of improvement to IER quality as a result of the 2011 Revisions. 
Accordingly, expert firm BDO claims that although Revisions to RG 111 and RG 112 formalise 
practices already followed by many experts, the revisions will improve "the quality of IERs in 
general by ensuring that all experts follow the same practices" (BDO 2011, p.1). This leads to 
Hypothesis 1: 
H1: Higher quality IERs are issued after ASIC's 2011 Revisions to RG 111 and RG 112, 
compared to other IERs 
New independence requirements were also imposed on the commissioning firm as a result of 
the 2011 Revisions. In particular, the onus for determining whether the expert is independent 
and has the requisite expertise and resources to provide a thorough report rests with the 
commissioning party (RG 112.39). "The quality of an expert report may be affected if this is 
not the case" (RG 112.39). ASIC requires the directors of the commissioning firm to 
demonstrate that they have considered more than just the expert's quoted fee when selecting an 
expert (BDO 2011). An empirical study by Monroe (1973) has shown that when the quality of 
product or service is uncertain, consumers often assume that higher prices signify higher 
quality. When a target firm commissions an independent expert, a high level of uncertainty 
exists regarding the quality of the expert report. Consequently, commissioning firms may 
expect that experts with higher fees provide higher quality reports. This leads to Hypothesis 2: 
H2: Experts with lower fees provide lower quality valuations, compared to other valuations. 
 
 
                                                                
32 Mineral assets at the pre-reserve stage are “estimated to be in the ground”, but “may or may not be 
economically recoverable” (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2011, p.16). If the expert has reasonable grounds to do so, 
they can use DCF to value projects which are yet to generate cash flows, such as mineral assets (mining or 
hydrocarbon projects), in the resource stage. However, when DCF is used to value these assets the expert is 
required to make more extensive disclosures of their assumptions and inputs (BDO 2011). 
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SAMPLE AND METHOD 
Sample 
This paper uses the event study method to test whether IER quality improved following the 
2011 Revisions. To test the hypotheses, an empirical approach is adopted, using a sample of 
all ASX listed companies that have been acquired and delisted between 2008 and 2013 
(inclusive). More specifically, the sample only includes acquisitions of companies in which the 
target has commissioned an IER, and the bidder's consideration was 100% cash. The sample 
of takeovers used in this study includes both legally required and voluntarily commissioned 
IERs, given that both are subject to the Corporations Act and RG 111 and RG 112. Takeovers 
using the bidders' scrip as full or partial consideration were excluded from the sample due to 
the added complication of assessing the quality of the bidder's scrip. Takeovers using bidders' 
scrip accounted for a small minority of takeovers in the test period and therefore are not 
considered to materially affect the findings of the study. 
Sample Collection Process 
This study uses a transparent data collection process, with a sufficiently large sample size of 
107 observations following a thorough filtering process to make statistical inferences. First, a 
list of all ASX listed companies which were successfully acquired and delisted between 2000 
and 2013 was compiled using the Factset Mergers and Acquisitions screening function.33 The 
Factset data included details about each transaction including transaction value, bid price, 
announcement date, completion date, competing bidders, method of payment and numerous 
more fields. Second, the list was filtered to only include takeovers announced between 2008 
and 2013. This list was then filtered to only include acquisitions in which the method of 
payment provided by the bidder was exclusively cash. In the small number of cases where the 
Factset data left the method of payment blank, research was undertaken to determine the form 
of consideration used, and the takeover was included or excluded accordingly. Next, the ASX 
Announcements database was searched for each of the remaining target companies to ascertain 
whether an IER was commissioned. Where applicable, the IER was most commonly found in 
the Target Statement or Scheme Booklet released in response to the takeover bid. The final 
sample comprised 107 successful cash takeovers for ASX listed companies in which an IER 
was released between 2008 and 2013. Observations were evenly distributed with 53 taken from 
the pre-revisions period and 54 observations in the post revisions period. For each observation, 
the requisite data was hand collected from IERs, other relevant ASX announcements and the 
Securities Institute Research Centre of the Asia-Pacific (SIRCA) database. 
Comprehensive List of Data Sources 
To ensure its accuracy, the Factset data was verified using the ASX Announcements for each 
target company. Where necessary, amendments were made to reflect the ASX Announcement 
data. The required details were collected from each IER, including the expert's opinion, IER 
release date, the expert's valuation (low and high) and primary valuation methodology, whether 
the expert has other business dealings with the target, whether the report was legally required 
or voluntarily commissioned, the expert's fee and the number of pages in the expert report. 
Furthermore, the most recent annual report since the release of the IER was obtained for each 
target company. The annual report was used to collect information regarding the target 
company's number of subsidiaries, industry segments and the book value of equity.  
                                                                
33 Factset is a multinational financial data and software company. 
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Finally, the SIRCA database was utilised to obtain historical share price data of delisted 
companies to determine the target's market capitalisation (used to calculate the target's market-
to-book ratio) and the share price one day prior to the first takeover announcement. 
MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the distribution of observations in the sample by year 
and primary valuation methodology. The data has also been split according to whether the IER 
was issued before or after the event date (ED) of 30 March 2011 when ASIC issued the revised 
RG 111 and RG 112: 
𝐸𝐷 =
0 𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝐸𝑅 𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 1 𝐽𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑢𝑟𝑦 2008 𝑎𝑛𝑑 29 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ 2011        
1 𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝐸𝑅 𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 30 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ 2011 𝑎𝑛𝑑 31 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 2013 
 
The final three rows of the last column in Table 1 reveals that there are 107 IERs included in 
the sample, of which 53 were issued prior to 30 March 2011 (ED=0), and 54 were issued on 
30 March or later (ED=1). The timeframes before and after the event date were selected so as 
to ensure that the number of IERs for ED=0 and ED=1 were approximately equal.  
Table 1 also reveals that the four valuation approaches were not equally utilised as primary in 
the 107 IERs in the sample34. Capitalised earnings was the most 'popular' valuation approach, 
being used as primary in 47% of the IERs. DCF and asset based approaches were the second 
and third most utilised primary valuation approaches, accounting for 24% and 16% of the IERs, 
respectively. Other approaches to valuation were only used as primary in 7% of observations, 
while 6% of observations did not disclose which method was used as primary. In contrast, 
Matolcsy's (1995) study of all IERs issued between 1988 and 1993 found the most popular 
methodologies were asset based approaches (31%) and capitalised earnings (27%), with only 
8% of IERs using DCF. Therefore, it appears that expert valuation methodology preferences 
have changed over time. DCF may have become more popular over time due to its growing 
acceptance by academics (such as Matolcsy 1995) and regulators (such as ASIC's 2011 
Revisions allowing the use of DCF to value mineral assets which was previously prohibited). 
Furthermore, asset based approaches appear to have lost popularity, and capitalised earnings 
appears to have gained popularity.  








OTHER UNDISCLOSED TOTAL 
2008 1 3 1 0 4 9 (8%) 
2009 6 4 2 2 1 15 (14%) 
2010 5 14 4 2 0 25 (23%) 
2011 8 14 3 3 1 29 (27%) 
2012 3 10 4 1 0 18 (17%) 
2013 3 5 3 0 0 11 (10%) 
Total 26 (24%) 50 (47%) 17 (16%) 8 (7%) 6 (6%) 107 (100%) 
ED = 0 12 24 7 5 5 53 (50%) 
ED = 1 14 26 10 3 1 54 (50%) 
Total 26 (24%) 50 (47%) 17 (16%) 8 (7%) 6 (6%) 107 (100%) 
 
                                                                
34 Although prior to the 2011 Revisions experts were not required to disclose the primary valuation 
methodology used in their report, many did so voluntarily. 
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Table 2 shows the average fees paid for IERs during the test period adjusted for CPI and their 
standard deviation. 
- Table 2: Expert Fees by Year35in Australia 
Issue Year N MEAN ($) SD ($)        MEAN (CPI ADJUSTED $) 
2008 7 97,857 72,907 111,303 
2009 15 149,167 114,032 166,742 
2010 25 170,900 174,594 185,650 
2011 29 207,879 237,012 218,950 
2012 18 143,222 141683 148,722 
2013 11 126,182 110,138 129,676 
Total 105 163,710 172,522 174,712 
ED=0 51 152,941 140,796 167,971 
ED=1 54 173,880 198,711 181,079 
Total 105 163,710 172,522 174,712 
 
Table 3 reveals that the 107 IERs in this sample are distributed widely between the expert firms. 
Of the 107 IERs, 37% were prepared by the corporate finance or advisory functions of 'Big 4' 
accounting firms. No single firm dominated the provision of IERs. However, specialist 
valuation practice, Lonergan Edwards (established in 2001 by ex-PwC partners) prepared the 
most IERs within the sample, accounting for 19%. 
- Table 3: Australian IERs by Expert Firm and Year 
Expert Firm 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 TOTAL 
Lonergan Edwards 3 2 6 5 3 1 20 (19%) 
Deloitte 1 5 1 4 1 4 16 (15%) 
BDO 0 3 2 6 2 0 13 (12%) 
KPMG 2 0 3 6 2 0 13 (12%) 
Grant Samuel 1 1 2 3 2 1 10 (9%) 
Ernst & Young 0 1 2 1 1 2 7 (7%) 
PwC 0 1 2 0 1 0 4 (4%) 
Others (7 others) 2 2 7 4 6 3 24 (22%) 
Total 9 15 25 29 18 11 107 (100%) 
‘Big 4’36 3 7 8 11 5 6 40 (37%) 
Non-‘Big 4’ 6 8 17 18 13 5 67 (63%) 
Total 9 15 25 29 18 11 107 (100%) 
 
Table 4 provides some descriptive statistics relating to the IERs in the sample to offer an 
overview of the takeover market during the period of the study. This includes the range of 
takeover premiums, expert's fees, complexity of the target given the number of its subsidiaries 
and industry segments, size of target by way of market capitalisation and market to book ratio, 
and substance of the report by the length of the report and the number of days it took to produce. 
 
                                                                
35 CPI adjusted fees were converted to December 2013 dollars using Consumer Price Index (CPI) data released 
by the Australian Bureau of Statistics. Two IERs prepared by Lonergan Edwards in 2008 were not included in 
the fees data due to disclosing that the expert firm was paid a reasonable hourly rate rather than stating the dollar 
amount of their remuneration. 
36 ‘Big 4’ refers to the world’s largest global accounting firms, Deloitte, KPMG, PwC and Ernst & Young. 




- Table 4: Descriptive Statistics37 for the Australian Sample 
Variable N MEAN MEDIAN SD MIN MAX 
       
Takeover premium (%) 107 46.30 38.04 41.79 -58.20 226.92 
Expert’s fee ($000’s) 105 163.71 110.00 172.52 17.50 1,250.00 
Number of industry segments 107 1.44 1.00 1.00 1.00 6.00 
Number of subsidiaries 107 18.56 9.00 29.01 0.00 163.00 
Market capitalisation ($mil) 107 629.12 123.93 1,662.03 1.29 11,563.29 
Market-to-book ratio (times) 107 16.06 1.32 119.60 -74.77 1173.74 
Length of expert report (pages) 107 67.84 67.00 23.71 21.00 132.00 
Days of report production 107 55.60 40.00 49.58 0.00 359.00 
 
Table 5 presents the breakdown of the coding of dichotomous variables with reference to the 
event date. The vast majority of takeovers were judged as fair and reasonable by experts (81%), 
which was expected given the sample only includes successfully executed takeovers. Over half 
(57%) of the IERs were voluntary where no legal obligation existed for the target firm to 
commission an IER. In contrast, Bugeja (2007) found that just below a quarter of all IERs 
issued for takeovers between 1990 and 2000 were voluntarily commissioned. This may suggest 
that the voluntary use of IERs has increased in popularity since 2000. Indeed there is a growing 
trend for boards to voluntarily commission IERs to protect not only shareholders, but also the 
board itself (Maslen-Stannage 2014, ASIC v Healey 2011, FCA 717). Only 20% of the IERs 
were prepared by an expert who has other business dealings with the target. Despite the 
increased independence requirements of the 2011 Revisions, a slightly higher proportion of the 
IER issuing firms in the ED=1 subsample had other business dealings with the target than in 
the ED=0 subsample. The opposite was expected to be true given the more restrictive 
independence requirements placed on the commissioning firm. Only the expert opinion shows 
a significant change in both coded 1 and 0 proportions. 
- Table 5: Dichotomous Variables 
Variable ED=0 ED=1 TOTAL 
Expert Opinion    
       Coded 1 (Fair and reasonable) 39 48 87 (81%) 
       Coded 0 (Not fair and reasonable) 14 6 20 (19%) 
       Total 53 54 107 (100%) 
Voluntary    
       Coded 1 (Voluntary) 31 30 61 (57%) 
       Coded 0 (Not voluntary) 22 24 46 (43%) 
       Total 53 54 107 (100%) 
Other Business Dealings    
       Coded 1 (Other business dealing) 9 12 21 (20%) 
       Coded 0 (No other business dealings) 44 42 86 (80%) 
       Total 53 54 107 (100%) 
                                                                
37 The variables are defined in the IER Quality Model. 
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Multiple Regression IER Quality Model 
A linear ordinary least squares multiple regression model of IER quality was designed and 
implemented to test the hypothesis of this study. The multiple regression model of IER quality 
is as follows: 
Quality = α + β1lnMktcap + β2Subs + β3Ind + β4lnPage + β5MB + β6Days + β7EO+ β8OBD + 
β9Vol + β10Prem + β11 ED*lnFee + β12ED + β13ED*DCF + ε 
Where Quality is defined as the absolute difference between the expert’s valuation and the 
executed price (hereafter referred to as the ‘scaled distance’) and scaled range, as defined in 
Equations 1 to 5; lnMktcap is defined as the natural logarithm of the target firm’s market 
capitalisation as at the financial year-end prior to the takeover announcement; Subs is defined 
as the number of subsidiaries reported by the target firm as at the financial year-end prior to 
the takeover announcement; Ind is defined as the number of industry segments reported by 
the target firm as at the financial year-end prior to the takeover announcement; lnPage is 
defined as the natural logarithm of the number of pages in the expert report; MB is defined as 
the target firm market-to-book ratio; Days is defined as the number of days between the 
takeover announcement and release of the expert report; EO is defined as the indicator variable 
coded as 1 if the expert expresses a fair and reasonable opinion, otherwise coded 0; OBD is 
defined as the indicator variable coded as 1 if the expert has other business dealings with the 
firm commissioning the IER, otherwise coded 0; Vol is defined as the indicator variable coded 
1 if the expert report is voluntarily commissioned, otherwise coded 0; Prem is defined as the 
takeover premium equal to the percentage difference between the executed price and the 
target’s market value one day prior to the first bid (on average, our sample prices show no 
leakage for dates above the 3rd/4th day lag, as well as no significant difference by using either 
the price a day before versus the price 3 to 4 days before the takeover announcement); lnFee is 
defined as the natural logarithm of the expert’s CPI adjusted fee for producing the report; ED 
is defined as the indicator variable for the event study event date, coded as 1 if the IER is issued 
between 30 March 2011 and 31 December 2013, otherwise coded 0 (when IER is released 
between 1 January 2008 and 29 March 2011); and DCF is defined as the indicator variable 
coded 1 if DCF is the expert’s primary valuation methodology, otherwise coded 0. It also 
should be noted that measurement of IER quality is inherently problematic and has been 
estimated in this study using proxies selected and developed based on the support of their use 
by Bugeja, Da Silva Rosa and Walter (2005).  
IER Quality: The Expert's Valuation Relative to the Executed Price 
The primary objective in ascertaining quality is to measure the distance between the expert's 
valuation and the executed price, regardless of whether that valuation is above or below the 
executed price. Therefore, the scaled distance is utilised as a proxy of report quality, which can 
be expressed as: 
- 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 =    
 
− 1   
- Equation 1: Scaled Distance 
The scaled distance will always be a positive number as it expresses the absolute difference 
between the expert's valuation and the executed price. An expert report is measured as higher 
(lower) quality when the absolute distance is closer to (further from) zero. The relationship 
between the expert's valuation, executed price and scaled distance can be expressed as: 
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𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡 𝑠 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 × (1 ±  𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒) 
Given experts provide a range of values rather than a single valuation point, this study uses 
several different valuation points to express the expert's valuation in the scaled distance 
formula: the mid-point, low value and high value. Therefore, this study uses the following 
additional three proxies of report quality: 
𝑀𝑖𝑑 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 (𝑀𝑆𝐷) =   
(𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝐿𝑜𝑤 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)/2
𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
− 1   
- Equation 2: Mid Scaled Distance (MSD) 
 
𝐿𝑜𝑤 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 (𝐿𝑆𝐷) =   
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡 𝑠 𝐿𝑜𝑤 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
− 1   
- Equation 3: Low Scaled Distance (LSD) 
 
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 (𝐻𝑆𝐷) =   
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡 𝑠 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
− 1   
- Equation 4: High Scaled Distance (HSD) 
IER Quality: The Scaled Range of the Expert's Valuation 
The dependent variable used by Bugeja, Da Silva Rosa and Walter (2005) is the difference 
between the experts' high and low valuation of the target expressed as a percentage of the 
target's share price three months prior to the takeover announcement. However, their results 
were unchanged when the mid-point of the expert's valuation was used as a scalar. Accordingly, 
as an additional proxy of IER quality, this study defines the scaled range as follows:    
 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 (𝑆𝑅) =  
    
    
 
- Equation 5: Scaled Range (SR) 
All tests of IER quality were run using each of the four aforementioned proxies of IER quality: 
MSD, LSD, HSD and SR. Using these four proxies will lead to more informative conclusions 
than if one proxy was used in isolation. 
Controls for Factors Influencing the Scaled Distance and Scaled Range 
Competition and Synergy 
Competition and synergy may influence the accuracy of the expert's valuation relative to the 
executed price (Mandelker, 1974, Ruback, 1983, Brown and Horin, 1986). Synergies play an 
important role in determining the price the bidder is willing to pay for the target. Given this, an 
expert's valuation may diverge from the executed price if the successful bidder can extract 
significant synergies that are not available to other bidders. Madura and Ngo (2008, p.333) find 
that "in a competitive market for takeover bids, the takeover premium serves as an effective 
proxy for the expected synergy." Therefore, the takeover premium is used to control for 
synergy. This study adopts Madura and Ngo's (2008) definition of takeover premium as the 
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percentage difference between the executed price and the target's market value one day prior 
to receipt of the first takeover bid. 
Expert's Opinion 
The expert's opinion is controlled for given it has the ability to influence the executed price. 
Eddey (1993) found that a takeover is more likely to succeed, and less likely to result in an 
increased bid, when the expert expresses a fair and reasonable opinion. Therefore, the expert's 
opinion impacts the executed price by influencing shareholders' decision to accept the proposal. 
A bidder may be more likely to revise its offer upwards when the expert provides an opinion 
other than fair and reasonable. 
Valuation Complexity 
The inherent level of complexity in valuing the target may influence the accuracy of the expert's 
valuation relative to the executed price, and thus a control is required. Damodaran (2007) 
argues that it is more difficult to value companies which are comprised of a larger number of 
business units and subsidiaries. Deciphering' economic reality' becomes increasingly opaque, 
causing estimation of fundamental inputs into valuation models to become less accurate. 
Bugeja, Da Silva Rosa and Walter (2005) identify a number of factors which affect a valuation. 
Companies with a high degree of decentralisation (measured by the number of subsidiaries) 
and diversification (measured by the number of industry segments) are more complex to value. 
Complexity of valuing the target increases with firm size (measured by market capitalisation), 
the target firm's reliance on growth options, (measured by the market-to-book ratio) and expert 
report length (measured by number of pages). Experts with more time to produce their report 
will provide a more accurate valuation. The period to prepare the IER is controlled for by the 
number of days between the takeover announcement and the report release (Bugeja, Da Silva 
Rosa and Walter 2005). Finally, Bugeja (2007) suggests that firms voluntarily commission 
IERs in circumstances where there is a high level of valuation complexity or as a defensive 
tactic to evade a hostile takeover (Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe, 2010). As such, a control 
variable is added for voluntarily commissioned IERs. 
IER Quality Model vs Bugeja, Da Silva Rosa and Walter's (2005) Model 
While Bugeja, Da Silva Rosa and Walter (2005) use the scaled range of the expert's valuation 
as a proxy for report quality, they recommend future researchers use the expert's valuation 
relative to the executed price as a proxy of report quality. However, they do not provide specific 
details of how to measure this. A contribution of this study is in defining MSD, LSD and HSD. 
Although the model used in this study adopts six of the control variables used by Bugeja, Da 
Silva Rosa and Walter (2005), two of their variables have been omitted, and two of their 
variables were merged into one variable. Given the focus of this study, indicator variables for 
whether the expert was from a 'Big 6/5' firm or not (ExptB6 and ExptNB6) are omitted from 
Bugeja, Da Silva Rosa and Walter's (2005) original model.38 Additionally, Bugeja, Da Silva 
Rosa and Walter (2005) included variables indicating whether the expert was the target's 
current auditor (Expaud) and whether the expert had other (non-audit) business dealings with 
the target (Exprel). The IER quality model in this study includes a variable for other business 
dealings (OBD), which comprises both audit and non-audit dealings. This study also 
contributes eight variables not included in Bugeja, Da Silva Rosa and Walter's (2005) model. 
                                                                
38 The ‘Big 6/5’ is an expression used to describe the large international accounting firms during the period in 
which Bugeja, Da Silva Rosa and Walter’s (2005) study took place. Since the collapse of Arthur Andersen, it 
has been known as the ‘Big 4’ comprised of KPMG, PwC, Deloitte and Ernst & Young. 




Testing H1: Event Study of the 2011 Revisions 
As previously mentioned, the data sample was split into the following two groups: 
𝐸𝐷 =
0 𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝐸𝑅 𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 1 𝐽𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑢𝑟𝑦 2008 𝑎𝑛𝑑 29 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ 2011        
1 𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝐸𝑅 𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 30 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ 2011 𝑎𝑛𝑑 31 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 2013 
 
The ED=0 and ED=1 mean and standard deviation are calculated for each proxy of IER quality: 
MSD, LSD, HSD and SR. If the means and standard deviations are lower for ED=1 than ED=0, 
and the differences are statistically significant, this is indicative of an improvement in average 
IER quality and a reduction in the variation of IER quality subsequent to the 2011 Revisions. 
For MSD, LSD, HSD and ER, a two-sample t-test is carried out to determine if the ED=0 mean 
and ED=1 means are significantly different from one another at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels 
of significance.39 The t-statistic reveals whether the two means are significantly different from 
one another. Where the t-statistic is 1.66 or larger, the difference between the ED=1 and ED=0 
means are at least significant at the 0.1 level. Furthermore, the statistical significance of the 
difference between the means will be examined with reference to p-values. If the p-value is 
less than the significance level (0.1, 0.05 or 0.01) the difference between the means is said to 
be statistically significant to the independent variable (MSD, LSD, HSD and SR). 
Furthermore, for MSD, LSD, HSD and SR, an F-test is undertaken to determine if the ED=0 
standard deviations are significantly different from that of ED=1 at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels 
of significance.40 The F-statistic and p-value reveal whether the two standard deviations are 
significantly different from one another. If the p-value is less than the significance level (0.1, 
0.05 or 0.01) the difference between the ED=1 and ED=0 standard deviations is statistically 
significant. 
Testing H2: Fees and Quality 
To determine whether experts with higher fees provide higher quality reports, the betas and t-
statistics for lnFee in the IER quality model are examined for MSD, LSD, HSD and SR. A 
negative beta suggests that there is an improvement in IER quality for a given increase in the 
expert's fee. A reduction in MSD, LSD, HSD and SR is consistent with an improvement in IER 
quality. On the other hand, if there is a positive beta for fees, it suggests that there is a reduction 
in IER quality for a given increase in the expert's fees. The t-statistics of the lnFee coefficients 
are inspected to determine whether the estimates are statistically significant at the 0.1, 0.05 and 
0.01 levels of significance. 
 
                                                                
39 This is a two tailed test since the null hypothesis is that the ED=0 mean is equal to the ED=1 mean. Therefore, 
the test determines whether the ED=1 mean is greater than, or less than, the ED=1 mean. A two tailed test allots 
half of the level of significance, α, to testing the significance in each direction. For example, if α=0.1, then 0.05 
of the level of significance would be allotted to either tail of the student’s t-distribution. Given this is a two 
sample t-test, the degrees of freedom is equal to the sum of the number of used observations in the ED=0 and 
ED=1 subsamples minus 2 (105-2=103). There were 105 observations used (rather than 107) due to the two 
experts disclosing the expert’s fee as ‘a reasonable hourly rate’ which was not quantified, rather than a total 
dollar figure. 
40 This is a one tailed test since the null hypothesis is that the standard deviations of ED=0 and ED=1 are equal. 
The standard deviation can only take on a positive value. Therefore, the test determines whether the ED=1 
standard deviation is greater than the ED=0 standard deviation. A one tailed test allots the entire level of 
significance, α, to testing the significance in one direction. For example, if α=0.1, then 0.1 of the level of 
significance would be allotted to the right tail of the F distribution. 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Test of H1: Event Study of the 2011 Revisions 
Table 6 compares the average MSD, LSD, HSD and SR for ED=1 with those for ED=0. In 
support of H1, the results indicate that average MSD and HSD were significantly lower for 
ED=1 than ED=0 by almost half. The MSD and HSD mean decreased from 0.2324 and 0.2827 
before the 2011 Revisions to 0.1129 and 0.1230 afterwards, representing a reduction of 11.95% 
and 15.97% with t-statistics of -2.57 and -2.87 respectively. Although the average LSD and SR 
were lower for ED=1 than ED=0, the differences were not statistically significant with t-
statistics of -1.48 and -0.96. The negative coefficient estimates for ED in the IER quality 
regression model are also consistent with a significant reduction in MSD and HSD, even in the 
presence of the control variables.  
Furthermore, the results indicate that there was a significant reduction in standard deviation 
across all proxies of IER quality subsequent to the 2011 Revisions. Consistent with a significant 
decrease in the volatility of IER quality, the standard deviation for MSD, LSD, HSD and SR 
reduced by 24.01%, 23.63%, 28.80% and 30.94% with F-statistics of 4.11, 2.91, 6.25 and 6.50 
respectively. This suggests that there was a considerably higher degree of variation in IER 
quality prior to the 2011 Revisions. The variation in MSD, LSD, HSD and SR are discussed 
further below when the quartiles are analysed. 
Overall, the results in Table 6 are indicative of an improvement in IER quality and are 
consistent with H1: that IER valuations produced subsequent to the 2011 Revisions are more 
accurate relative to the executed price, and have a smaller scaled range, than IERs produced 
prior to the 2011 Revisions. Additionally, the significant reduction in the standard deviation of 
MSD, LSD, HSD and SR for ED=1 suggests that there was drastically less variation in the 
quality of IERs prepared in accordance with the 2011 Revisions. 
To reinforce the notion that the change of the regulatory framework has had a positive impact 
on the quality of IERs in the Australian case, an identical control test was conducted using a 
sample of valuations from the New Zealand market during a commensurate period where there 
was no regulatory change. This test comparing two jurisdictions, both under a similar judicial 
system and operating within similar corporate environments is intended to provide some 
robustness to the results. The New Zealand control test showed no change to valuation quality 
during a period of no regulatory change. This control test reinforces the benefits of the 
Australian regulatory reform in this area. 
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- Table 6: Primary Event Study of the Australian 2011 Revisions 
 MID SCALED DISTANCE (MSD) LOW SCALED DISTANCE (LSD) HIGH SCALED DISTANCE (HSD) SCALED RANGE (SR) 
ED Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
0 (n=53) 0.2324 0.3055 0.2497 0.2889 0.2827 0.3794 0.2780 0.4073 
1 (n=54) 0.1129 0.1506 0.1819 0.1694 0.1230 0.1518 0.2202 0.1597 











        
***2.8700 
 





*, **, *** denotes statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively 
 
- Table 7: Quartiles of MSD, LSD, HSD and SR for the Australian Sample 
 MID SCALED DISTANCE (MSD) LOW SCALED DISTANCE (LSD) HIGH SCALED DISTANCE (HSD) SCALED RANGE (SR) 
Quartile ED = 0 ED = 1 ED = 0 ED = 1 ED = 0 ED = 1 ED = 0 ED = 1 
Min 0.0000 0.0011 0.0031 0.0000 0.0000 0.0066 0.0000 0.0000 
Q1 0.0250 0.0236 0.0609 0.0625 0.0525 0.0472 0.1043 0.1114 
Median 0.0824 0.0828 0.1133 0.1290 0.1050 0.0857 0.1431 0.1664 
Q3 0.4002 0.1421 0.3292 0.2727 0.3625 0.1515 0.2867 0.2651 
Max 1.0575 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.6190 1.0000 2.0000 0.7852 







Regression Model of IER Quality 
Table 8 presents the regression coefficient estimates and t-statistics for MSD, LSD, HSD and 
SR. A negative coefficient indicates a reduction in MSD, LSD, HSD and SR for a one unit 
increase in a given variable. Given that a reduction in scaled distance and scaled range is 
indicative of an improvement in IER quality, a negative coefficient suggests that IER quality 
improves as the variable increases. 
The only variable which is significantly negatively related to MSD, LSD, HSD and SR is 
lnMktcap. If lnMktcap increases by $1 then MSD, LSD, HSD and SR decrease by 
approximately 7%, 6%, 8% and 8% respectively. The valuation of firms with a larger lnMktcap 
was assumed to be more complex, and thus a positive coefficient indicative of a reduction in 
IER quality was expected. However, a potential explanation for the negative coefficient for 
lnMktcap is that larger companies are more likely to be covered by information intermediaries 
such as equity research analysts and credit rating agencies, which may assist the expert in 
providing a more informed, higher quality valuation.41 
In addition to the lnMktcap coefficients being significant, EO, ED and lnPage had significant 
coefficients under MSD and HSD. DCF was significant for HSD and SR. All other variables 
(Subs, Ind, MB, Days, Revs, OBD, Vol, Prem and lnFee) had a statistically insignificant effect 
on MSD, LSD, HSD and SR. 
The results support H1, but do not support H2. In support of H1, that IER quality improved 
subsequent to the 2011 Revisions, ED had significant negative coefficients under MSD and 
HSD.42 This means that when ED=1 (from 30 March onwards – the date the 2011 Revisions 
were implemented), and all other variables set to zero, MSD and HSD decrease by 
approximately 7% and 9%, consistent with an improvement in IER quality. Conversely, H2 is 
rejected given the lnFee coefficients are not significant, suggesting that there is an insignificant 
relationship between the expert's fee and quality of the report.  
The Days coefficients were insignificant, indicating that MSD, LSD, HSD and SR are not 
significantly impacted by the number of days between the takeover announcement and release 
of the expert report. This suggests that IER quality is relatively uniform regardless of how long 
the expert has to prepare their report. IER quality is also relatively uniform regardless of the 
target's number of subsidiaries and segments, market-to-book value ratio, or whether the report 
is voluntarily commissioned as opposed to legally required. Contrary to the findings of Bugeja, 
Da Silva Rosa and Walter (2005), report quality was not significantly different when the expert 
had other business dealings with the target. 
Similarly, Prem had statistically insignificant coefficients for all four proxies of IER quality, 
suggesting that MSD, LSD, HSD and SR are not significantly impacted by the premium paid 
by the bidder. Assuming Prem is an appropriate proxy for synergy effects, the results suggest 
that IER quality (measured using MSD, LSD, HSD and SR) is not significantly impacted by 
synergies available to the bidder. The Prem coefficient of -0.1132 under SR shows minimal 
change with a t-statistic of -1.49. 
                                                                
41 Equity research analysts (the equity research arm of investment banks such as Goldman Sachs, Macquarie 
Group and JPMorgan) provide ‘broker reports’ which recommend whether investors should buy (overweight) or 
sell (underweight) shares in selected publicly listed companies. Credit rating agencies, such as Moody’s, Fitch 
and Standard &Poor’s, assess the creditworthiness of corporations by considering the likelihood the company 
will default on their debt obligations. 
42 Although the ED coefficient was negative for LSD and SR, they were not statistically significant with t-
statistics of -0.98 and -0.84. 
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Multicollinearity was not evident between most variables.43 The following variables have 
Pearson correlation coefficients above 0.3: lnFee with days (0.30), lnMktcap (0.66), subs (0.60) 
and lnPage (0.45); and subs with lnMktcap (0.33). However, the nature of what each of these 
variables measure is fundamentally distinct. The units in which they are measured are also 
different. Given this, these variables were retained in the regression model. 
The adjusted R2 indicates that the model explains approximately 28%, 12%, 4% and 15% of 
the variation in MSD, LSD, HSD and SR respectively. All four models are significant as the F-
statistics show that LSD and SR are significant at the <5% level and MSD and HSD are 
significant at the <1% level. Although Intercept has significant coefficients across all four 
proxies of IER quality, it is not meaningful as several of the variables in the model cannot 
realistically be set to zero, such as lnPage, and lnFee. 
Test of H2: Relationship between Fees and Report Quality 
The insignificant coefficients for lnFee_ED in Table 8 do not support H2, suggesting that in 
the presence of the other control variables, experts with higher fees do not provide valuations 
(1) which are more accurate relative to the executed price, and (2) with a narrower scaled 
valuation range. Despite having positive coefficients indicative of deterioration in quality for a 
given increase in lnFee, the estimated increases in MSD, LSD, HSD and SR are not significantly 
different from zero as evidenced by their respective t-statistics. 
The implication of these results is that commissioning firms cannot assume that an expert with 
higher fees will provide a higher quality report on average. Rather, the findings imply that the 
commissioning firm should select the expert with the lowest quoted fees. However, in reality, 
this may not be suitable as the utility of the report may be influenced by other factors. An 
alternative approach could include forming a shortlist of potential suitable experts, from which 
the commissioning firm should select the expert with the lowest quoted price. When selecting 
an expert, commissioning firms are required by ASIC to demonstrate that more factors than 
just the quoted fee has been considered (BDO 2011). Generally, suitable experts are those 
which are independent and have sufficient expertise and resources to provide a high quality 
report. Although Bugeja, Da Silva Rosa and Walter (2005) found that experts with any type of 
other business dealings with the target charge significantly lower fees, the utility of such reports 
may be limited due to a perceived lack of independence. In particular, Bugeja (2005b) found 
reports prepared by the target's auditor were viewed as non-independent by the market. 
Therefore, although the results of this study suggests that the commissioning firm should select 
the expert with the lowest fees, it may be prudent to consider other factors such as the actual 
and perceived independence of the expert. 
This section presented, interpreted and discussed the empirical results of the experiments 
undertaken to test the two hypotheses in this study. Consistent with H1, the results indicate that 
there was an overall improvement in IER quality subsequent to the 2011 Revisions. 
Inconsistent with H2, the results indicate that the relationship between expert fees and IER 
quality (indicated by MSD, LSD, HSD and SR) is insignificant.  
                                                                
43 Multicollinearity exists when there is a high degree of correlation between two or more predictor variables in 
a multiple regression model. The existence of multicollinearity increases the standard errors of the coefficients 





- Table 8: Australian IER Quality Regression Model Estimates 
 MID SCALED DISTANCE (MSD) LOW SCALED DISTANCE (LSD) HIGH SCALED DISTANCE (HSD) SCALED RANGE (SR) 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
Intercept 1.2304 *** 3.49 1.3131 *** 3.49 1.4292 *** 3.72 2.0871 *** 4.05 
lnMktcap -0.0686 *** -3.72 -0.0638 *** -3.24 -0.0768 *** -3.83 -0.0785 *** -2.96 
Subs -0.0000 -0.04 0.0006 0.58 -0.0003 -0.26 0.0004 0.28 
Ind -0.0040 -0.18 0.0014 0.06 0.0022 0.09 0.0232 0.77 
lnPage 0.1169 * 1.75 0.0575 0.80 0.1389 *1.90 -0.1082 -1.17 
MB 0.0001 0.78 0.0002 1.11 0.0002 0.83 0.0003 1.13 
Days -0.0001 -0.20 -0.0003 -0.55 -0.0001 -0.14 -0.0005 -0.77 
EO -0.2515 *** -4.32 -0.0971 -1.56 -0.4088 *** -6.44 0.0257 0.32 
OBD -0.0890 -1.64 -0.0956 -1.66 -0.0586 -0.99 -0.1172 -1.57 
Vol -0.0124 -0.28 -0.0369 -0.79 -0.0102 -0.21 -0.0642 -1.07 
Prem -0.0390 -0.72 -0.0371 -0.64 -0.0297 -0.50 -0.1132 -1.49 
lnFee_ED -0.0000 -0.12 0.0000 0.16 0.0000 0.06 0.0000 1.35 
ED -0.0720 * -1.67 -0.0436 -0.95 -0.0948 ** -2.02 -0.0459 -0.76 
ED_DCF  -0.0052 -1.07 -0.0103 1.13 -0.0971  *1.63 -0.0711 - 1.32 
F-statistic ***3.9500  **1.9900  ***6.3500  ** 2.2500  
Adjusted R2 0.2843  0.1178  0.4186  0.1451  
N 105.0000  105.0000  105.0000  104.0000  






Overall, this study is of interest to several groups, including regulators such as ASIC, firms 
commissioning IERs, expert firms and investors faced with a takeover offer. It answers several 
unique questions about the quality, fees and valuation methodologies of IERs in Australian 
takeovers by applying empirical methods and defining new proxies of report quality. It delivers 
evidence suggesting that ASIC's 2011 Revisions to their IER regulatory guides, RG 111 and 
RG 112, were successful in improving report quality. By disproving the notion that expert fees and 
report quality are positively related, this paper provides commissioning firms with insights when 
selecting an expert in a market with widely diverging quoted fees. IER quality is inherently 
subjective and can only be measured through the use of a proxy. The proxies used for IER quality 
are the expert's valuation (mid, low and high) relative to the executed price, and the scaled range 
of the expert's valuation. The use of these revised measures for IER quality when combined, 
constitute a significant contribution of this study.  
To further reinforce results and conclude that the change of the regulatory framework has had a 
positive impact on the Australian case, a control test was conducted by using a sample of valuations 
from the New Zealand market. The New Zealand control test showed no change to valuation 
quality during a period of no regulatory change. This control test reinforces the benefits of the 
Australian regulatory reform in this area. 
It is suggested that future researchers continue to scrutinise the most appropriate proxy for IER 
quality as well as including the speed with which IER quality improved. It would also be of interest 
to consider takeovers using equity of the acquiring firm as consideration in their bids. Moreover, 
future research could include IER quality and valuation by industry, as well as the impact of the 
2011 Revisions on expert independence. Any pre and post study relating to the introduction of new 
regulations could also assess the differential impact on valuation quality in failed as well as 
successful deals. Fees may also differ between successful and failed deals. Data on unsuccessful 
bids was not available for this study. Further tests could explain whether there are specific reasons 
that drive the target firm to select voluntary expert reports. 
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